Complaint August 26, 2024 (2024)

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Filing # 205521345 E-Filed 08/26/2024 10:37:45 AM IN THE COUNTY COURT IN AND FOR MIAMI-DADE COUNTY, FLORIDA Country Club Trust, LLC CASE NO. d/b/a/ Country Club Towers Plaintiff VS Vanessa Cabrera and all others in possession Defendant(s) PLAINTIFF’S COMPLAINT FOR TENANT EVICTION Plaintiff, Country Club Trust, LLC d/b/a Country Club Towers brings action against Defendant(s), Vanessa Cabrera and all others in possession, and alleges 1 This is an action to evict a tenant from real property in MIAMI-DADE County, Florida 2. Plaintiff is the Landlord, and Defendant(s) is/are the tenants of the following described property in said county, 6750 NW 186 St #516 Miami, FL 33015 Defendant(s) has/have possession of the property under a written agreement, copy attached or oral agreement, to pay rent of $2,137.00 payable on the first of the month. Defendant(s) failed to pay total rent due on August 1, 2024 Plaintiff served Defendant(s) with a notice on August 5, 2024 to pay the rent or deliver possession but the Defendant(s) refuse to do either, a copy of which notice is attached hereto as Plaintiff Exhibit nan 6 Said written agreement provides for Attorney's fees in an action for tenant's default thereunder. 7 Defendant(s) is/are not known to be in the military service of the UnitedpStates of America. Wherefore Plaintiff demands judgment for possession of the property, atto: y's fees, and costs of this action against Defendant(s). The foregoing instrument was acknowledged before me this August 26, 2024 by Mariel Barberena Marie! orized Property Manager who is personally known to me. 8730 N 36th Ave Miami, FL 33147 305-558-0060 DocuSigned by: Clave. Tho NOTARY. PUBLIG.STATE OF FLORIDA wok one ss CLARA ELENA THEN MY COMMISSION # HH 536444 EXPIRES: June 30, 2028 aliiTHREE DAY NOTICETO: Vanessa Cabrera and all others in possession of 6750 NW 186 St #516 Miami, FL 33015 located in Miami-Dade County, Florida.You are hereby notified that you are indebted to me in the sum of $2,403.72* Dollars for rent and use of thepremises described above and now occupied by you.I demand payment of the said rent or possession of the premises within three (3) days (excluding Saturdays,Sundays, and legal holidays), from the date of the delivery of this notice, to wit on or before 08/08/2024.Your rent is payable from month to month due on the first of each month in the amount of $2,137.00.This is an attempt to collect a debt and any information obtained will be used for that purpose. As required bylaw.This notice is given to you pursuant to Florida Statutes S 83.56 (3).Please be governed accordingly.United Property Management, Inc.Dania Rodriguez - Authorized Community ManagerCountry Club Towers18335 NW 68th AvenueHialeah, FL 33015(305) 823-0000 This notice was served upon the person owing the rent. x The person owing same was absent from his last usual place of residence, and this notice was left atthe said residence by posting.by: Doarigc DATE: 08/05/2024* Total amount owed through end of current calendar month. If your lease expires prior to the end of the month, you must pay rent through the date your lease expires. Please feel free to contact your Community Manager if you have any questions.RentPlus Addendum The RentPlus service is a credit reporting and financial tool provided by Simplified Business Group, LLC, also known as Rent Dynamics, to report Resident’s rent payments due under the Rental Agreement to one or more consumer reporting agencies (e.g., Equifax, TransUnion, and/or Experian). Enrollment in RentPlus is entirely optional and is not a condition of this Rental Agreement. The cost of the RentPlus service is $8.95 per month if there is one Resident participating, or a combined service fee of $14.95 per month if there are multiple Residents participating. The monthly fee will be charged with Resident’s rent bill on an automatic recurring basis unless and until Resident cancels. Charges are non-refundable. After enrolling in RentPlus, Resident may cancel the RentPlus service at any time, for any or no reason, by logging in at my.rentplus.com/login and clicking on Account Settings, by sending written notice of termination to Rent Dynamics at 91 East 700 South, Logan UT 84321 — Attn RentPlus Service Charge, or contacting Rent Dynamics directly at support@rentplus.com. Resident must cancel no later than ten (10) days before the end of the month to avoid being charged for a subsequent month. | acknowledge and agree that TransUnion may provide my individual credit reports to Simplified Business Group, LLC (“Rent Dynamics”) solely for the purpose of tracking changes to my credit score over periods of time in order to measure the effectiveness of Rent Dynamics’ RentPlus program. Rent Dynamics will make such credit score information available to me in my RentPlus resident portal for so long as | am enrolled in RentPlus. For more information about the RentPlus service, please refer to the FAQs located at www.rentplus.com/faq/. By signing below, or electronically accepting through your landlord, Resident is enrolling in RentPlus and agrees to the terms and conditions set forth in this addendum and the RentPlus Terms of Use that can be found at www.rentplus.com/terms-of-use. The RentPlus services and fees may be altered or otherwise modified by Rent Dynamics with thirty (30) days’ advance notice to Resident. Resident’s failure to cancel the RentPlus service (as described above) after receiving such notice constitutes acceptance of any such changes. Rent Dynamics is an intended third-party beneficiary of this addendum. If you have any questions, please contact Rent Dynamics at support@rentplus.com or 855-388-5314. Resident Signature Date Resident Signature Date Resident Signature Date Resident Signature Date"Vanessa Cabrera * Albjandro UnlluenaPARCEL/PACKAGE ACCEPTANCE AND RELEASE ADDENDUM THIS ADDENDUM TO THE LEASE AGREEMENT is entered on 04/25/2024, by and between Country Club Towers// United Property Management, Inc. hereinafter designated as Lessor ”Landlord” and Vanessa Cabrera hereinafter as Lessee “Resident” whose address is 6750 NW 186 St #516 Miami, FL 33015. Resident hereby authorizes Landlord, Landlord’s agents/representatives to sign for and/or accept on resident’s behalf, any parcel/package delivered to resident, including but not limited to any parcel/package delivered by the U.S. Postal Service or by any private courier service or individual. Residents understands and agrees that landlord may refuse to accept any parcel/package that, in their sole discretion: (i) contains perishable items; (ii) poses a danger to any person or property; or (iii) is a size and/or weight that they are either unable or unwilling to store or maintain for any period of time. Sign-up Fees: Resident agrees to a one-time administrative sign-up fee of 125.00 as part of the parcel/package services. At the initial sign-up, residents are responsible to provide the landlord an accurate email for all authorized parcel/package locker users in their apartment. It is further agreed that landlord will not be responsible for updated or inaccurate email addresses previously provided. Resident hereby acknowledges and agrees that parcel/package services are NOT available to non- residents. Parcel restrictions: Maximum weight of parcel/package is restricted to 50 Ibs. or less. Parcel/package cannot be larger than 37 inches wide, 70 inches tall, and 23 inches deep. The landlord may refuse to accept any parcel/package that exceeds the above stated parcel/package restrictions. Resident acknowledges and agrees that any parcel/package that is attempted to be delivered (whether addressed to resident or any other occupant in their apartment) that does not fit in the Luxor locker(s) will not be accepted at the landlord’s community. Landlord, landlord’s representatives, affiliates, etc. will not be liable for its whereabouts, whether returned or lost. To ensure all residents are afforded this amenity, residents may receive a maximum limit of 5 parcels/packages a week per apartment. Excessive Parcel/Package Usage: Resident’s receiving over 5 parcels/packages a week per apartment will constitute excessive parcel/package usage and resident agrees to pay the following surcharges: . Six (6) through ten (10) parcels/packages a week per apartment, resident will incur a surcharge of $3 per parcel/package Eleven (11) through fifteen (15) parcels/packages a week per apartment, resident will incur a surcharge of $5 per parcel/package Over fifteen (15) parcels/packages a week per apartment, resident will incur a surcharge of $10 per parcel/package The above stated excessive usage amounts and surcharges are subject to change at landlord’s discretion. Additionally, Resident agrees that any abuse or misuse of the parcel/package services either by resident or resident’s occupants will result in resident, and all other users in resident’s apartment being indefinitely prohibited from the use of said parcel/package services. Rev 07.3021"Vanessa Cabrera” Alejandro ValbuonaParcel/Package Pick up, Return to Sender, or Dispose of: Resident(s) agrees that parcels/packages MUST be picked up immediately upon receipt of notice. Further, Resident agrees all parcels/packages not picked up within 48 hours of delivery date will result in resident incurring a fee of $3 daily, per package, commencing on the 3“ day from delivery date. Said fees will continue until the 7" day of the delivery date, for a maximum amount of $15 per package, to be paid to landlord as an additional rent. Parcels/packages not picked up within 7 days from the delivery date will be returned to sender on the 8" day from the parcel/package delivery date, i.e., delivery date January 10, if not picked up by resident by January 17, the parcel(s)/package(s)will be returned to sender on January 18, or disposed of. Resident(s) agrees to all costs, as above stipulated. All parcel/package fees, surcharges, etc. are deemed rent and will be collected as same. Release of Liability: Residents agrees that Landlord, landlord’s agents and their affiliates are not responsible for any parcel/package and residents hereby agrees the landlord, landlord’s representatives/employees are released from any liability pertaining to parcels/packages. Resident(s) agrees that Landlord, its agents and employees are not responsible for verifying the condition upon receipt of goods on behalf of the Resident(s), or for the proper storage for the goods of the Resident(s). Resident specifically waives any right of action that may brought concerning acceptance or denial of a parcel/package for the Resident(s) by the Landlord, its agents, employees, owners, successors and assigns. Resident(s) hereby understands and agrees that the Landlord will not be held liable for any loss, or damage to parcel(s)/package(s) and hereby acknowledges and agrees to indemnify the Landlord, its agents, employees, owners, successors, and assigns for any costs, fees, or judgments, including attorney fees, should any third party make a claim against or sue the Landlord based upon the loss or theft of a parcel/package which was directed to the Resident(s) or to the premises of the Resident(s) by the third party claiming damages or loss. Resident agrees any issues with parcels/packages are to be addressed with Luxor One’s customer service at (415) 390-0123, and not with landlord, or any of landlord’s representatives. It is hereby acknowledged by the parties that they have read, understand, and agree to all the terms stated above regarding the use of parcel/package services. IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the landlord has hereunder caused this agreement to be executed by its duly authorized and constituted agent and the resident(s) has/have hereunto set her/his hand and seal on the day and year hereafter. In the presence of: LESSEE/RESIDENT: AGENT FOR LESSOR/OWNER: Resident Signature Owner/Agent Name Resident Signature Owner/Agent Signature Rev 07.3021° Vanessa Cabrera * Alajandre ValluenaUNITED PROPERTY MANAGEMENT, INC ADDENDUM TO RESIDENTIAL LEASE AGREEMENT PROMOTIONAL DISCOUNT Date: 04/25/2024 By and between Country Club Towers/United Property Management, Inc. (hereinafter designated as “lessor/owner”), and Vanessa Cabrera (hereinafter designated as a LESSEE(S) “RESIDENT”. WITNESSETH: That the LESSOR and the LESSEE hereby mutually agree that there will be a Promotional Discount in the amount of $1,656.00 which will be credited against rent on the above-mentioned contract as follows: gz $1,656.00 amortized through term of the lease Cc $0.00 off the first month’s rent. Cc $0.00 off the last month’s rent. Monthly net rent will be $2,137.00. This allowance is subject to LESSEE fulfilling the term of this Lease. Should this Lease be terminated for any reason, prior to the expiration date, the LESSEE agrees that all discounts are due and payable to LESSOR/LANDLORD. This paragraph is not applicable where resident(s) has previously signed the early termination addendum depicting his/her option to pay the two month early termination fee, pursuant to F.S. 83.595(4). United Property Management, Inc. LESSEE/RESIDENT: AGENT FOR LESSOR/OWNER: Resident Signature Owner/Agent Name Resident Signature Owner/Agent Signature Resident Signature Resident Signature Community: Country Club Towers Address: 6750 NW 186 St #516, Hialeah, FL 33015"Vanessa Cabrera * Albjandro UnlluenaUNITED PROPERTY MANAGEMENT, INC APARTMENT #: DATE OF LEASE MONTHLY RENT INITIAL LEASE TERM 750 516 03/09/2024 2,275.00 Beginning: 04/25/2024 MARINA RENTAL STORAGE RENTAL PET RENT PARKING RENT Ending: 04/24/2025 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 SECURITY DEPOSIT PRORATE RENT PET FEE KEY DEPOSIT PREPARED BY 0.00 $427.40 $0.00 $0.00 Alejandro Valbuena SURETY BOND SURETY CERTIFICATE ID $4,000.00 STY-2022-02246C9149 ESIDENT(S LANDLORD: Vanessa Cabrera United Property Management, Inc. As Agent for Owner LANDLORD'S ADDRESS: 8730 N.W. 36" Avenue NAME(S) OF OCCUPANTS: Miami, FL 33147 APARTMENT ADDRESS: 6750 NW 186 St #516 Miami, FL 33015 LANDLORD hereby leases and RESIDENT(S) agrees to lease the above describe Apartment upon the Terms and Conditions stated in this Residential Lease Agreement: 1. RENT: The total monthly rent is payable in advance and is due on or before the first (1st) of each month. Time is of the essence; Rent payments MUST BE paid using Landlord’s online payment site (the resident online portal), or by using an online electronic payment system approved by the landlord. Rent payments will only be accepted in the leasing office if Landlord’s online payment site (resident portal), or online electronic payment systems are unavailable. Payments may NOT be made in cash, money order or cashier’s check, unless specifically requested by the landlord. Resident agrees rent received after the close of business on the third (3") day of the month, in which it is due, will incur an additional rent charge of 10% of the monthly rent or remaining unpaid monthly rent balance on the fourth (4") day of the month for failure to pay rent on time. This covenant survives the expiration of the lease agreement and applies to month-to-month tenancies. However, we reserve the right to refuse payment three days after we serve you with demand for rent or possession as provided for in Florida Statutes, plus any accrued additional rent charge. Month to month charges/fees are deemed additional rent. Parcel and package locker/room charges/fees are also deemed as additional rent. Resident acknowledges water is deemed rent and all payments for water shall be made payable to the water company or paid electronically on the landlord’s online payment site (resident portal.) Water payments must be received by or before the first (1st) day of the following month. Resident agrees to pay such water usage and a late payment of 10%, if applicable, as additional rent. All payments remitted by resident will be applied pursuant to generally accepted accounting principles and at landlord’s discretion, including but not limited to rent payments, additional rent payments, water payments, payments for damages, parking rent, storage rent, etc. If resident remains in possession of the apartment after the expiration of the lease agreement with landlord’s approval, and resident does not sign a new lease agreement, resident shall be considered a month to month tenant. As a month to month tenant landlord can charge market rate, which increases as the market increases, plus month to month rent costs hereby deemed rent, or landlord may charge double the rent pursuant to Florida Statutes 83.58, whichever option landlord chooses. In addition, if resident fails to pay month to month rent on or before the third (3rd) of each month resident will incur an additional rent charge of 10% for failure to payVanessa Cabrera Alejandro Ualluena Rev:08.07.2024UNITED PROPERTY MANAGEMENT, INC their rent on time. Month to month tenancies will not be prorated, the full month’s rent is payable in advance pursuant to Florida Statute 83.46 (2). The first full month’s rent shall be paid before you occupy the apartment. However, if the beginning term commences on a day other than the first day of the month of your lease, the following month shall be the month that is pro-rated. (a) If your rent payment is dishonored, returned by the bank, or if your electronic payment is rejected, it must be made good by immediately making the rent payment in the leasing office with a certified or cashier’s check, or money order using. To this there shall be added a charge of fifty ($50.00) dollars to cover bank costs/ rejected electronic payment fees, plus an additional rent charge of 10% for failure to pay the rent on time. The additional rent, bank fees/rejected electronic payment fees, and eviction/processing fees if incurred, shall be deemed additional rent and shall be collected in the same manner as rent. (b) Parking fees will be deemed additional rent and shall be collected in the same manner as rent. (c) Pet rent will be deemed additional rent and shall be collected in the same manner as rent. (d) Storage payments may be collected pursuant to Florida Statutes. (e) Transfer fees and damages will be deemed additional rent and shall be collected in the same manner as rent. (£) Electric/Utility charges will be deemed additional rent and shall be collected in the same manner as rent. (g) All covenants pertaining to rent survive the expiration of the agreement. (h) Rent Reporting will be deemed additional rent and shall be collected in the same manner as rent. 2. UTILITIES: You must obtain electric service for your apartment, if separately metered. We are not liable for any interruption or malfunction in service of any utility due to any cause. You may not occupy your apartment without electric service. 3. OCCUPANCY: Only those persons whose names appear on this lease may occupy the apartment. No other persons may occupy the apartment for more than three (3) days per month without prior written consent of the LANDLORD or its Agent. Such consent may be withheld for any reason or for no reason. There will be a charge of an additional $100.00 per month per person in rent, for occupancy of others not on this lease. The apartment is to be used by the resident for the purpose of private housing. You further agree not to use, nor permit the apartment to be used for any illegal, immoral or improper purpose, nor to permit any disturbance, noise or annoyances whatsoever detrimental to the comfort and peace of any of the inhabitants of the premises. You may not assign this lease or sublet any portion of your apartment without our prior written consent. Such consent may be withheld for any reason or for no reason. Furthermore, resident acknowledges and agrees that it is prohibited for any resident to lease any part of the premises and/or to advertise the premises through an internet platform, i.e., Airbnb, Sonder, etc. 4, PETS: NO PETS MAY BE KEPT IN THE APARTMENT OR THE PREMISES WITHOUT LANDLORD’S PRIOR WRITTEN CONSENT, AND UNLESS RESIDENT HAS EXECUTED A PET AGREEMENT, PAID PET FEE(S) AND PAID MONTHLY PET RENT. AMOUNTS FOR PET FEE AND MONTHLY PET RENT ARE BASED ON CURRENT MARKET STANDARDS AND SUBJECT TO CHANGE. THE PET FEE IS IN ADDITION TO THE APARTMENT SECURITY DEPOSIT. THE PET RENT AND PET FEE(S) MUST BE PAID PRIOR TO THE PET LIVING IN THE APARTMENT. THIS POLICY DOES NOT APPLY TO THERAPY, COMPANION, EMOTIONAL SUPPORT and SERVICE ANIMALS. RESIDENT, RESIDENT’S immediate family and persons in the apartment with RESIDENT’S consent shall be responsible for curbing and cleaning up after their pet, and properly disposing of such waste immediately. Any resident found in violation will be fined a clean-up fee of $150.00 per incident. Said fee will be deemed as additional rent and collected as same. 5. THERAPY, COMPANION, EMOTIONAL SUPPORT and SERVICE ANIMALS: Resident agrees to be totally responsible for the animal’s behavior in the event their animal harms any other person on the landlord’s property or creates any other type of disturbance. Furthermore, resident agrees to abide to the following policies as it pertains to their therapy, companion, emotional support or service animal: The animal must be under the control of their owner at all times. Animal’s behavior cannot at any time pose a threat to the health or safety of others. The animal must not disturb the rights, comforts, or quiet enjoyment of other residents, guests, or persons on the landlord’s property, inside or outside the dwelling unit. The animal must be curbed in the proper designated areas. Resident will be responsible to pick up after their animal in the event they discharge urine or feces. In the event of a pest infestation (fleas, ticks, etc.) resident agrees to be responsible for pest control of their unit over and above the normal pest control provided by the landlord. Also, a current photograph of resident’s therapy, companion, emotional support or service animal MUST be provided to landlord and resident agrees to follow all registration requirements. 6. MEDICAL MARIJUANA: Residents and occupants requiring the use of medical marijuana for an authorized medical condition, as pursuant to Federal/State/Local laws, must consume this substance in accordance to these laws, ordinances, etc. Consumption must be in the form of pills, oils, or vaporization, or as determined by law. Resident agrees that the use of medical marijuana, by them or their occupants, invitees or visitors, must be consumed in resident’s apartment and not in common areas of the community. The smoking of this substance shall comply with landlord’s odor policy and/or shall not disturb or disrupt other residents right to quiet and peaceful enjoyment of the premises.” Vanessa Cabrera ~~» Alejandro Ualbuena Rev:08.07.2024UNITED PROPERTY MANAGEMENT, INC 7. DEFAULT: Upon your default in complying with this lease, our Community Policies or relevant law which provides that if the apartment is abandoned or vacated prior to the expiration of the term, we shall continue to hold you responsible for all rental losses under the lease and deficiencies will be reported to the credit bureau. In addition, management will pursue all other remedies available under the law to recover losses incurred by the breach of this lease. Losses may include, but are not limited to, unpaid rents, damages to the apartment, legal costs, etc. 8. ATTORNEY’S FEES: In any proceeding to enforce this lease, the prevailing party shall recover all costs and fees incurred including, but not limited to, the following: Court filing fees, process service fees, preparation and service of three-day notice, service and execution of default package including writ of possession and reasonable attorney’s fees. Attorney’s fees and costs incurred will be considered additional rent. Any disputes shall be governed in Miami Dade County, State of Florida. 9. TERMINATION: Upon termination or expiration of this lease, you agree to vacate the premises peaceably and immediately. The apartment must be left in the same condition as it was at the beginning of the lease, damage due to a reasonable wear and tear excepted. If any of your property is left in the apartment or on the premises after termination or your vacating or abandoning the apartment, or if it is put in any unauthorized area, we may remove, dispose of, or place that property in storage and charge you accordingly and you waive any claims for damages as a result of our disposal of the property. If you fail to deliver all keys and fail to move out on or before your lease termination date, you shall pay double rent until you do so. Lessee shall give 60 days’ written notice to vacate prior to expiration date of lease. Failure to give the 60 days written notice to vacate, prior to termination of lease will result in one-month additional rent as liquidated damages to the landlord. In the event Lessor/Landlord elects not to renew the lease agreement, Lessor/Landlord will provide Lessee /Resident a sixty (60) days’ notice that the lease will not be renewed. 10. RENEWAL: This agreement shall automatically terminate as of the expiration date set forth above, without notice from Lessor, unless execution of a “Renewal Addendum” by Lessee(s). If any monies are due at time of termination of this lease, and a new lease is signed, it is hereby agreed that all monies due shall be due to owner as rent or additional rent and will be collected as same. 11. NOTICES: Any notices from us to you shall be deemed delivered when deposited at the post office, to your apartment, postage prepaid, regular or certified mail, return receipt requested, personally handed to you or anyone in your apartment or left at your apartment in your absence by posting or any other form. In addition, 24-hour pest control notice will be emailed and posted in the common areas of the building. Any notice from you to us shall be deemed delivered when deposited at the post office, addressed to our office, postage prepaid, certified mail, return receipt requested. The person designated as the “Manager” is the person authorized to act on our behalf. 12. RIGHT TO ENTER: We shall have the right to enter your apartment for inspection, extermination, maintenance and repair during reasonable hours, at any time in an emergency, or as provided otherwise by law. 13. REPAIR AND MAINTENANCE: You acknowledge that you have inspected the apartment and are fully satisfied and accept it in its "as is" condition, except as otherwise agreed, to by you and us in writing. You are responsible for the removal of trash and garbage from your apartment and kept in a clean and sanitary manner. Damages to lock/ keys, lost or damaged by you will be repaired and/or replaced by us at your expense. We shall maintain air conditioning and heating equipment, although you must pay for any repair occasioned by your misuse or neglect. You must check your smoke detectors weekly, replace the battery if applicable, to ensure that they are working properly. You must change your A/C filters monthly, or more often if required, please contact the leasing office to find out the location where you get the a/c filters. Storing items in the a/c closet is strictly prohibited. Stored items may damage the a/c system. You shall use plumbing fixtures and facilities, electric systems and other mechanical systems in the manner designed. Glass products, including but not limited to, Glass Stove Tops and Glass Tub and Shower Doors are durable, but are not immune to the impact of heavy objects. Dropping, banging or dragging a heavy object will likely cause extensive damage, including shattering/cracking of glass. Glass is fragile and must be handled with care, understanding these risk factors will help you practice proper caution when handling these items. Any and all damages caused by you or your family or invitees to these items, to the apartment or premises, whether by misuse, neglect, accident, intentionally or otherwise, will be corrected, repaired, or replaced at your expense, as additional rent to be paid immediately. In addition, should resident or resident’s guests or invitee’s actions compromise manufacturer’s warranty/guarantee, resident will be financially responsible for replacement of said item(s). Resident agrees to notify landlord in writing of any needed maintenance or repair. Resident acknowledges and agrees landlord is not responsible for any bodily injury as a result of misuse of the above-mentioned glass items. 14. ALTERATIONS: You shall not make alterations, or additions nor install or maintain in the apartment, or any part of the premises, any fixture, appliance, devices or signs without our written consent, which may be withheld for any reason or no reason unless prohibited by law. Any alterations, additions or fixtures, which are made after you have received our written consent, shall remain a part of the apartment, unless we specifically agree otherwise. Any costs associated with any alteration, device, etc., including but not limited to permit fees, liens, or fines will be the responsibility of the resident(s). Said costs will be deemed additional rent and collected as same. A permit deposit will be required on any alteration, work, installation, etc. requiring a permit. The permit deposit? Vanessa Cabrera” Alejandro Ualluena Rev:08.07.2024UNITED PROPERTY MANAGEMENT, INC will be refunded once the permit is finalized and closed (This is the resident’s responsibility and resident must show proof of this to landlord.) 15. REIMBURSEMENT BY RESIDENT: Resident agrees to reimburse landlord promptly in the amount of the loss, property damage or cost of repairs or service (including plumbing trouble) caused by negligence or improper use by Resident, Resident’s agents, invitees, family or guests, Resident shall be responsible for any damage resulting from windows or doors left open. Such reimbursement shall be due immediately upon demand by Landlord. Landlord’s failure or delay in demanding damage reimbursement, late-payment charges, returned check charges or other sums due from resident, shall not be deemed a waiver thereof; and landlord may demand same at any time, including move-out. IT IS UNDERSTOOD AND AGREED THAT LANDLORD MAY AT ANY TIME AND FROM TIME TO TIME DEDUCT DAMAGE REIMBURSEMENTS, UTILITY CHARGES, LATE PAYMENT CHARGES AND/OR RETURNED CHECK CHARGES, OR ANY PORTIONS THEREOF, FROM RESIDENT’S SECURITY DEPOSIT, WITHOUT WAIVER OR ANY OTHER RIGHTS OR REMEDIES OF LANDLORD. 16. LIABILITY: We shall not be liable for any damage, loss or injury to persons or property occurring within your apartment or upon. the premises whether due to our action or inactions, or from any other cause whatsoever. We make no representation of any kind to protect you or anyone else, your property or anyone else's property from the negligent or criminal acts of others. You are responsible for all liability insurance coverage on your apartment and, with respect to your family, licensees or invites, agree to save and hold us harmless and indemnify us from any liability. WE STRONGLY RECOMMEND THAT YOU SECURE YOUR OWN INSURANCE TO PROTECT YOURSELF FROM ALL SUCH OCCURRENCES. Landlord is not responsible for any damage that may result from any acts of God. *SEE ATTACHED SECURITY DISCLOSURE STATEMENT 17. RENTER’S INSURANCE REQUIREMENT: United Property Management, Inc. requires that all residents carry renter’s insurance. This requirement applies to residents with conventional leases and Housing Assistance/Section 8 leases. Prospective Residents/Residents must have an effective policy in place at time of move in. If not presented to landlord/landlord’s representative, prior to move in, then the prospective resident hereby agrees that a Tenant Legal Liability insurance policy, hereinafter referred as TLL insurance policy, will be automatically purchased for the prospective resident/resident’s apartment. These TLL fees are deemed additional rent and will be collected as same. Said TLL insurance will minimize resident’s liability in the event resident or resident’s invitee causes damages to the landlord’s property. Prospective resident/resident will be responsible to pay the TLL insurance fee for said coverage, which is approximately $15 monthly, however TLL insurance fees are subject to change. Renter’s insurance must be in place at all times during resident’s occupancy. Prospective resident/resident agrees to permit landlord to provide landlord’s preferred insurance provider with their name, address and other related information. Landlord’s preferred insurance provider agrees to keep all information secure and confidential. 18.FIRE AND CASUALTY: Fire Protection is available on the premises. If your apartment becomes uninhabitable because of fire, explosion, or other casualty, we may at our option, terminate this Lease or repair the apartment within thirty (30) days. If we elect not to repair the apartment, this Lease shall terminate. If we do elect to repair the apartment, and if the damage is not due to your negligence, this rent shall be abated during the time you cannot occupy the apartment. Nothing shall be used or kept in or about your apartment that would in any way affect the terms and conditions of our fire and extended coverage policy or be a violation of law. 19. WAIVERS: Our acceptance of rent after knowledge of a breach of the Lease by you is not a waiver of our rights nor an election not to proceed under the provisions of this Lease or the law. For purposes of a breach that is subsequent or continual non-compliance this waiver is not applicable. Our rights and remedies under this Lease are cumulative; the use of one or more shall not exclude or waive our rights to other remedies. Your rights under this Lease are subordinate to any present or future mortgages on the premises. In addition, it is agreed that the above-stated parties knowingly, voluntarily and intentionally hereby agree to waive any constitutional, statutory, or common law right to participate in or receive money or any other relief from any class, collective, or representative proceeding. 20. JURY TRIAL WAIVER: Resident and all other in possession knowingly, voluntarily, and intentionally hereby waives any constitutional, statutory, or common law right to demand a trial by jury in any action, proceeding, claim, or counterclaim, whether in contract or tort, or litigation of any matters, at law or in equity, arising out of or in any way related to the lease agreement or between resident and the landlord and all affiliates of the landlord. 21.POSSESSION: If the apartment is not ready for your occupancy on the beginning date of the Lease due to causes beyond our control, the beginning date shall be extended, but in no event more than thirty (30) days, at which time either party may terminate this Lease upon written notice to the other party. In no event shall we be liable in damages for any delays in giving you possession, but during any period that you are unable to occupy the Apartment, the rent will be abated."Vanessa Cabrera” Alejandro Valluena Rev:08.07.2024UNITED PROPERTY MANAGEMENT, INC 22. APPLICATION: You promise that the information given by you in your application is true and correct. If any of it is false, we may at our option, terminate this Lease for material non-compliance. You will notify us promptly in writing of any change in the information in your application. 23. SECURITY DEPOSIT: A: Before you may occupy the apartment, you must pay landlord the full Security deposit indicated on the face of this Lease or in lieu of Security Deposit, elect other options provided by Landlord, i.e., Security Deposit Alternative programs by third parties. Your security deposit, where applicable, is held for the full and faithful performance of the terms and conditions of this rental agreement. The security deposit shall be returned to you upon the expiration of term of this rental agreement less any amounts permitted to be retained by this agreement or by the Florida Statutes or both. The security deposit may be applied against any physical damages to the apartment or premises caused by you, your family or invitees. This security deposit will not, at any time, be considered rent in lieu of payments during occupancy. Any rents not paid during occupancy, will be deducted from the security deposit. In the event of a breach by you of any of the terms or conditions of this rental agreement, the security deposit may be forfeited, and at our discretion, be applied to damages; but it shall in no way be interpreted as preventing us from obtaining damages or taking any other appropriate legal action for the breach of this rental agreement including, but not limited to, filing a lawsuit against you and/or reporting you to a credit bureau. Damages are not limited to physical, new rental expenses will be recognized as damages (which include, but are not limited to our costs of advertising, screening prospective tenants, exhibiting the Apartment to prospective tenants, and leasing the Apartment to them). If more than one person signs this rental agreement as resident, any security deposit required to be returned to you shall be deemed returned if it is mailed or given and made payable to any or more of the persons who signs this rental agreement as resident. B. Your deposit, where applicable, is being held in an interest-bearing account as depicted below. You will receive interest on your deposit at the rate of 5% simple interest to be paid annually or interest in an amount of at least 75 percent of the annualized average interest rate payable on such account, whichever is lesser. First Horizon Bank City National Bank of Florida Citibank N.A. Wells Fargo Bank 165 Madison Avenue 100 SE 2™ St, 14" Floor Miami, FL 33131 201 S. Biscayne Blvd. Suite 420 Montgomery St. San Francisco, Memphis, TN 38103 3300 Miami, FL 33131 CA 94104 Lago Club Miami Bay Club Brickell West All Other United Property Royalton on the Green Brickell First Management Communities Suncoast Place Stadium Towers Cypress Place Miami Riverfront YOUR LEASE REQUIRES PAYMENT OF CERTAIN DEPOSITS, OR IN LIEU MAY OFFER OTHER OPTIONS PERTAINING TO SECURITY DEPOSIT ALTERNATIVES PROVIDED BY THIRD PARTIES. THE LANDLORD MAY TRANSFER ADVANCE RENTS TO THE LANDLORD’S ACCOUNT AS THEY ARE DUE AND WITHOUT NOTICE. WHEN YOU MOVE OUT, YOU MUST GIVE THE LANDLORD YOUR NEW ADDRESS SO THAT THE LANDLORD CAN SEND YOU NOTICES REGARDING YOUR DEPOSIT. THE LANDLORD MUST MAIL YOU NOTICE, WITHIN 30 DAYS AFTER YOU MOVE OUT, OF THE LANDLORD'S INTENT TO IMPOSE A CLAIM AGAINST THE DEPOSIT. IF YOU DO NOT REPLY TO THE LANDLORD STATING YOUR OBJECTION TO THE CLAIM WITHIN 15 DAYS AFTER RECEIPT OF THE LANDLORD’S NOTICE, THE LANDLORD WILL COLLECT THE CLAIM AND MUST MAIL YOU THE REMAINING DEPOSIT, IF ANY. IF THE LANDLORD FAILS TO TIMELY MAIL YOU NOTICE, THE LANDLORD MUST RETURN THE DEPOSIT, IF APPLICABLE, BUT MAY LATER FILE A LAWSUIT AGAINST YOU FOR DAMAGES. IF YOU FAIL TO TIMELY OBJECT TO A CLAIM, THE LANDLORD MAY COLLECT FROM THE DEPOSIT, BUT YOU MAY LATER FILE A LAWSUIT CLAIMING A REFUND. YOU SHOULD ATTEMPT TO INFORMALLY RESOLVE ANY DISPUTE BEFORE FILING A LAWSUIT. GENERALLY, THE PARTY IN WHOSE FAVOR A JUDGMENT IS RENDERED WILL BE AWARDED COSTS AND ATTORNEY FEES PAYABLE BY THE LOSING PARTY. THIS DISCLOSURE IS BASIC. PLEASE REFER TO PART II OF CHAPTER 83, FLORIDA STATUTES, TO DETERMINE YOUR LEGAL RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS.s C. The following is Florida Statute 83.49 (3), which we are required to provide to you:” Vanessa. Ca A Alejasdre Ualluweona Rev:08.07.2024UNITED PROPERTY MANAGEMENT, INC (3) (a) Upon the vacating of the premises for termination of the Lease, the Landlord shall have fifteen (15) days to return said security deposit, if provided, together with interest. If otherwise required, or in which to give the Tenant thirty (30) days written notice by certified mail of his intention to impose a claim thereon, at the Tenant's last known mailing address. The notice shall contain a statement in substantially the following form: "This is a notice of my intention to impose a claim for damages in the amount of $ upon your security deposit, due to . Itis sent to you as required by 83.49 (3), Florida Statutes. You are hereby notified that you must object in writing to this deduction from your security deposit within thirty (30) days from the time you receive this notice, or I will be authorized to deduct my claim from your security deposit." Your objection must be sent to 8730 N.W. 36" Avenue Miami, FL 33147. Address may be changed at landlord’s direction. If the LANDLORD fails to give the required notice within the thirty (30) day period, he forfeits his right to impose a claim upon the Security Deposit. (b) Unless the tenant shall object to the imposition of the LANDLORD'S claim, or the amount thereof, within thirty (30) days after receipt of LANDLORD'S notice of intention to impose a claim, the LANDLORD may then deduct the amount of his claim and remit the balance of the deposit to the Tenant. (c) If either party institutes an action in a court of competent jurisdiction to adjudicate his right to the Security Deposit, the prevailing party is entitled to receive his court cost, plus a reasonable fee for his attorney. The Court shall advance the cause on the calendar. (d) Compliance with this subsection by an individual or business entity authorized to conduct business in this state, including Florida licensed real estate brokers and sales persons, shall constitute compliance with all other relevant Florida Statutes pertaining to security deposits held pursuant to a rental agreement or other landlord - tenant relationship. Enforcement personnel shall look solely to this subsection to determine compliance. This subsection prevails over any conflicting provisions in chapter 475 and in other section of the Florida statutes. The return of the Security Deposit is predicated upon the following: (a) Full term of Lease has expired and all the provisions therein complied with. (b) Written notice of your intent to vacate the Apartment and not renew the Lease is sent via certified mail or personally delivered to the manager and a written receipt obtained a full sixty (60) days prior to vacating this Apartment. (c) No damage to apartment, or its contents, beyond reasonable wear and tear. (d) No unpaid additional rent charges or pet charges or delinquent rents or damage assessments due and payable. (e) Forwarding address and all keys left with management. You acknowledge that the Security Deposit may not be applied as rent, agree that the full month's rent will be paid the first day of each and every month, including the last month of occupancy. 24, SECURITY DEPOSIT ALTERNATIVE: Residents have the option to forego the traditional Security Deposit and instead choose to pay an Alternative Fee. If a resident decides to participate in this alternative fee

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Case Number: 24LBCV00396 Hearing Date: September 3, 2024 Dept: S25 Procedural Background On February 26, 2024, Plaintiffs filed a complaint against Defendants Tony Huy Lim, Margaret Chung and Does 1 to 20, alleging: 1. Breach of Contract 2. Breach of Warranty of Habitability 3. Breach of Covenant of Quiet Enjoyment 4. Wrongful Eviction 5. Violation of California Civil Code §1940.2 6. Violation of Long Beach Municipal Code § 8.101.030 7. Violation of California Civil Code § 1946.2 8. Negligence Plaintiffs allege that they were lawful tenants at a real property located at 6902 Eastondale Avenue, Long Beach, California (property) that they believe was owned, operated, managed and/or maintained by Defendants. (Compl., ¶ 6.) Plaintiffs also allege that the property leased to them by Defendants was an illegal, unpermitted unit. (Compl., ¶ 14.) 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Without the lease agreement, the rights of the parties are not properly alleged in the complaint. 5th Cause of Action Violation of Civil Code Section 1940.2 Civil Code section 1940.2 generally prevents landlords from using forceful, threatening, or menacing conduct that interferes with a tenant's quiet enjoyment of the premises. Plaintiffs have not sufficiently alleged facts to support the 60-day notice was inappropriate or wrongful. Further, allegations that Defendants sent a 60-day notice, failed to maintain the property in a habitable condition and failed to address citations issued by the City of Long Beach were forceful, threatening or menacing conduct that interfered with Plaintiffs quiet enjoyment of the property. 6th Cause of Action Violation of Long Beach Municipal Code Section 8.101.030 Long Beach Municipal Code § 8.101.030 provides that: No owner shall: B. Acting in bad faith, (i) fail to timely perform repairs and maintenance required by a rental agreement or by Federal, State, County or local housing, health or safety laws; (ii) fail to exercise due diligence in completing such repairs once undertaken; (iii) fail to follow appropriate industry repair, containment, or remediation protocols designed to minimize exposure to noise, dust, lead, paint, mold, asbestos, or other building materials with potentially harmful health impacts; or (iv) conduct elective renovation or construction of a rental housing unit for the purpose of harassing a tenant. D. Influence or attempt to influence a tenant to vacate a rental housing unit through fraud, misrepresentation, intimidation or coercion, which shall include threatening to report a tenant to the United States Department of Homeland Security. G. Take action to terminate any tenancy, including service of any notice to quit or other eviction notice, or bring any action to recover possession of a rental housing unit, based upon facts which owner has no reasonable cause to believe to be true or upon a legal theory which is untenable under the facts known to owner. M. Commit other repeated acts or omissions of such significance as to substantially interfere with or disturb the comfort, repose, peace or quiet of any person lawfully entitled to occupancy of a rental housing unit and that cause, are likely to cause, or are intended to cause any person lawfully entitled to occupancy of a rental housing unit to vacate such rental housing unit or to surrender or waive any rights in relation to such occupancy. (Long Beach Municipal Code section 8.101.030.) Plaintiffs have pled insufficient facts to support this claim. It is unclear whether Plaintiffs alleging that the entire property is illegal and uninhabitable. There are no facts alleged to support Plaintiffs assertion that the 60-day notice to vacate was illegal. Further, Plaintiffs do not allege that they complained about conditions during their tenancy or that Defendants refused to perform repairs after Plaintiffs requests. The demurrer as to the 1st, 2nd, 4th, 5th and 6th is SUSTAINED WITH LEAVE TO AMEND. Plaintiffs have 20 days from the date of this ruling to amend. In light of this courts ruling, Defendants motion to strike is moot.

Ruling

DEAN E. THAYER, TRUSTEE OF THE DEAN E. THAYER TRUST DATED 5/24/2011 VS VINCENT FLAHERTY, AN INDIVIDUAL, AND AS SUCCESSOR TRUSTEE OF THE KHG TRUST, ET AL.

Aug 27, 2024 |6/18/2022 |23SMCV06010

Case Number: 23SMCV06010 Hearing Date: August 27, 2024 Dept: I The court has received the motion to quash. An untimely opposition was filed on August 22, 2024. Plaintiff claims that the opposition should be considered because the proof of service of the motion is false; in fact, the defense claims, the papers were never served. The court has considered the opposition, but will give defendant an opportunity to submit a reply, as defendants have requested. In the reply, defendant should be sure to consider (among other things) plaintiffs position that the motion is moot because defendant moved to disqualify Judge Young pursuant to CCP section 170.6. That challenge was made on April 22, 2024, and it was granted the next day. Plaintiff might or might not be right about service of the complaint in general, but the court thinks that plaintiff has a point about the 170.6 challenge. That act constituted a voluntary general appearance. Generally speaking, if a defendant makes a general appearance, all defects of service are waived and jurisdiction is established. The court also notes that on May 23, 2024, defendants prior motion to quash was denied for issues relating to service, but without prejudice to bringing a new motion to quash and set aside the default. The court notes that plaintiff offered to stipulate to set aside the default if defendant was willing (1) to agree that service was complete as of that date and (2) answer within five days (the amount of time permitted normally in a UD case). Defendant refused to accept that proposal. In light of those proceedings and issues, the court stayed the writ of possession, but only until August 1, 2024. Plaintiff moved for reconsideration of the courts order, but the motion for reconsideration was denied on July 3, 2024. On July 29, 2024, defendant moved again to quash the summons, which is the motion now before the court. From this point forward, all service will be either electronically to the address that the court will obtain from the parties today or, if the parties will not stipulate to electronic service, then there will be a courtesy copy served electronically. In the instant case, plaintiff contends that he did not receive the electronic service of defendants motion. With the reply, defendant will submit the metadata from the email application that shows when the email was sent and delivered to the defense. The nice thing about email is that there is an electronic metadata stamp that will prove when it was sent and delivered. The failure to be able to produce that information will be deemed conclusive evidence that the email was never sent and that there was no service. On the other hand, if that information is produced, then it would demonstrate conclusively to the court that plaintiff is being untruthful with the court regarding service. This endless fighting about something as straightforward as proper service will end, and it will end now. For now, this hearing is continued for one week to September 3, 2024, at 9 am. Defendant will have until Thursday, August 29, 2024, at noon to file and serve the reply. The current reply will therefore be superseded by the new reply and will not be considered further by the court. Defendant should provide the court with a courtesy hard copy at the same time so that the court can be sure it will see it in time to consider the document before ruling. The court will discuss the fee waiver issues in camera.

Ruling

Aug 29, 2024 |18STCV10154

Case Number: 18STCV10154 Hearing Date: August 29, 2024 Dept: 1 18STCV10154 YOUNG CHOW DAI vs FELDMAN & ROTHSTEIN, P.C., et al. 1. Application for Order to Vacate Prefilijng [sic] Order and Remove Plaintiff Judicial Council Vexatious Litigant List Form VL-120 and First Amended Application for Order to Vacate Prefilijng [sic] Order and Remove Plaintiff Judicial Council Vexatious Litigant List Form VL-120 TENTATIVE RULING: The Application for Order to Vacate Prefiling Order and Remove Plaintiff Judicial Council Vexatious Litigant List (Form VL-120) and First Amended Application for Order to Vacate Prefiling Order and Remove Plaintiff Judicial Council Vexatious Litigant List (Form VL-120) are DENIED. Counsel for Defendant Anthony Ranieri to give notice. On December 31, 2018, Young Chow Dai filed 18STCV10154 against Feldman & Rothstein P.C., Anthony Ranieri, Mauro Fiore, Jr. APC, Krystal Rosal, and Marsha Mao. On November 22, 2022, the court entered an order dismissing the action. On April 8, 2024, Commissioner Latrice A. G. Byrdsong formally declared Young Chow Dai a vexatious litigant in Los Angeles Superior Court case 18STCV10154 Dai v. Feldman & Rothstein, P.C. Under this order, Dai became subject to a Code of Civil Procedure section 391.7 prefiling requirement that requires Dai to obtain the permission of the presiding judge to file new litigation. Permission is granted only if it appears the litigation has merit and is not being filed for purposes of harassment or delay. (Code Civ. Proc. § 391.7(b).) In the Los Angeles Superior Court, the Presiding Judge has designated the Supervising Judge of the Civil Division (sitting in Dept. 1) to exercise this authority and responsibility. (See Code Civ. Proc. 391.7(e).) Discussion In the May 31, 2024 and June 5, 2024 filings, Dai seeks to vacate the prefiling order. Pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 391.8(a), an application to vacate a prefiling order shall be made before the judge who entered the order if that judge is available; otherwise, the application shall be made before the presiding judge or his or her designee. The Supervising Judge of the Civil Division, who sits in Department 1, is the designee of the presiding judge under this statute. (Code Civ. Proc. § 391.8(a).) However, Commissioner Latrice A. G. Byrdsong remains available in Department 8 of the Stanley Mosk Courthouse. Accordingly, Dai must submit any application to vacate the prefiling order directly to Commissioner Byrdsong for review. (Code Civ. Proc. § 391.8(a).) Because Dais application to vacate prefiling order is not properly before Department 1, the application is DENIED without prejudice as procedurally improper. In the June 5, 2024 filing, Dai also provides a letter listing causes of action and reference enclosed exhibits that were not filed. To the extent Dais filing seeks to file new civil litigation, the request is procedurally improper. A request to file new litigation should not be filed in an existing case. In the Los Angeles Superior Court, vexatious litigants should submit their requests to file new litigation at the filing window in the Stanley Mosk Courthouse. The documents will then be forwarded to Department 1 and be addressed in due course. Moreover, Dais request is insufficient to demonstrate any proposed new litigation has merit and has not been filed for the purposes of harassment or delay. (Code Civ. Proc. § 391.7(b).) When requesting leave to file new litigation, the litigant must provide a copy of the proposed pleading to be filed as well as evidence supporting the claims asserted therein. Though Dais submission refers to a formal complaint and supporting exhibit evidence, (Mot. at 4), Dais submission is not accompanied by a proposed complaint or evidence supporting the claims asserted. 2. Plaintiffs Motion for Order (Request to File New Litigation by Vexatious Litigant Form VL-110) TENTATIVE RULING: The Motion for Order (Request for File New Litigation by Vexatious Litigant Form VL-110) filed June 5, 2024 is DENIED. Counsel for Defendant Anthony Ranieri to give notice. Background On December 31, 2018, Young Chow Dai filed 18STCV10154 against Feldman & Rothstein P.C., Anthony Ranieri, Mauro Fiore, Jr. APC, Krystal Rosal, and Marsha Mao. On November 22, 2022, the court entered an order dismissing the action. On April 8, 2024, Commissioner Latrice A. G. Byrdsong formally declared Young Chow Dai a vexatious litigant in Los Angeles Superior Court case 18STCV10154 Dai v. Feldman & Rothstein, P.C. Under this order, Dai became subject to a Code of Civil Procedure section 391.7 prefiling requirement that requires Dai to obtain the permission of the presiding judge to file new litigation. Permission is granted only if it appears the litigation has merit and is not being filed for purposes of harassment or delay. (Code Civ. Proc. § 391.7(b).) In the Los Angeles Superior Court, the Presiding Judge has designated the Supervising Judge of the Civil Division (sitting in Dept. 1) to exercise this authority and responsibility. (See Code Civ. Proc. 391.7(e).) Discussion In the June 5, 2024 filing, Dai requests to file new litigation against the Defendants. The request is procedurally improper. A request to file new litigation should not be filed in an existing case. In the Los Angeles Superior Court, vexatious litigants should submit their requests to file new litigation at the filing window in the Stanley Mosk Courthouse. The documents will then be forwarded to Department 1 and be addressed in due course. Moreover, Dais request is insufficient to demonstrate any proposed new litigation has merit and has not been filed for the purposes of harassment or delay. (Code Civ. Proc. § 391.7(b).) When requesting leave to file new litigation, the litigant must provide a copy of the proposed pleading to be filed as well as evidence supporting the claims asserted therein. Dais submission is not accompanied by a proposed complaint. Finally, Department 1 denied Dais June 5, 2024 request to file new litigation against Feldman & Rothstein P.C., Anthony Ranieri, Mauro Fiore, Jr. APC, Krystal Rosal, and Marsha Mao on August 7, 2024. Once the vexatious litigants request to file has been denied because the proposed complaint lacks merit or is designed to harass or cause delay, he or she cannot simply try over and over again. (Colombo v. Kinkle, Rodiger & Spriggs (2019) 35 Cal.App.5th 407, 412.) As stated in the Courts August 7, 2024 order and argued by Defendants, Dais claims appear barred by all applicable statutes of limitations. Plaintiffs motion lacks merit and is DENIED.

Ruling

MAHRT vs Cornerstone et al

Aug 30, 2024 |SCV-270601

SCV-270601, MAHRT v. Cornerstone et al. RLI’s request for judicial notice is GRANTED. The demurrer to the first cause of action isSUSTAINED WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND. The demurrer to the second cause of action isSUSTAINED WITH LEAVE TO AMEND. Macario’s cross-complaint is severed from case no. SCV-270601. It will proceed under thecaption David Macario DBA Macario Insurance Group v. RLI Insurance Company, Moes 1 through 50,inclusive, with a new case number to be assigned by the clerk. RLI’s counsel is directed to prepare a written order consistent with this tentative ruling andcompliant with California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312.I. Factual background In July 2021, Garry and Gillian Mahrt (collectively “Plaintiffs”) entered into an agreement topurchase a 158-acre ranch for $2.6 million. Defendant Cornerstone Land Co. (“Cornerstone”) was the realestate broker representing both Plaintiffs and the seller in the transaction. On August 16, 2021, Plaintiffswired the full purchase price according to transfer instructions they had received by email purporting to befrom Gabriel Foster (“Foster”), an agent with Cornerstone. Unfortunately, the email was a fraud sent bydefendant Yang Liu, one of the principals of defendant CASL International, who had hacked into computersin California and learned enough about Plaintiffs’ upcoming real estate transaction to enable him to createthe fraudulent email. As a result, Plaintiffs’ $2.6 million went into CASL’s account at defendant JPMorganChase Bank, from which it has since been withdrawn. Cross-complainant David Macario (“Macario”) was Cornerstone’s insurance broker. Cross-defendant RLI Insurance (“RLI”) was Cornerstone’s errors and omissions (“E&O”) insurer, a relationshipthat began in 2018. On August 17, 2021, Cornerstone, with Macario’s assistance, filled out an applicationto renew the E&O policy for the twelve months beginning on September 17, 2021. Question 9 on theapplication asked whether Cornerstone had “any knowledge of any incident, a circumstance, an event, orunresolved fee dispute that may result in a claim.” Cornerstone responded “no.” The application also statedthat if Cornerstone learned of any information that would change that answer prior to the effective date ofthe coverage, September 17, 20201, Cornerstone would notify RLI in writing of that information. Macariosent the renewal application to RLI on August 18, 2021. RLI alleges that Plaintiffs informed Cornerstone of their loss on August 20, 2021, that Cornerstonenotified Macario of the loss on August 23, that Plaintiffs’ attorney informed Cornerstone of an investigationinto the loss on December 6, and that on or about December 15, Macario instructed Macario to file a formalclaim with RLI. However, Cornerstone first apprised RLI of the loss on March 15, 2022. On April 29 andagain on May 12, RLI denied coverage on the basis that Cornerstone had failed to inform them of Plaintiffs’potential claim prior to the beginning of the coverage period on September 17, 2021.II. Procedural background The underlying lawsuit was initiated on April 14, 2022, when Plaintiffs filed a complaint againstCornerstone, Foster, JPMorgan Chase Bank, Yang Liu, and several other entities. On October 5, 2023, RLI sued Cornerstone in the Eastern District federal court, RLI Insurance v.Cornerstone (no. 2:23-cv-02265), seeking rescission of the 2021-2022 insurance policy on the grounds ofCornerstone’s misrepresentation that did not know of any pending claims. On December 19, 2023, Cornerstone cross-complained in the case at bar against Macario forprofessional negligence for failing to notify RLI of the potential claim when he became aware of it, and forequitable indemnity. On March 8, 2024, Macario filed a cross-complaint (“Cross-complaint”) against RLI for declaratoryrelief and equitable indemnity. RLI demurred to the Cross-complaint on June 4, 2024, and moved, in thealternative to sustaining the demurrer without leave to amend, for severance of Macario’s cross-action fromthe underlying lawsuit. This matter comes on calendar for hearing on that motion.III. Judicial notice RLI requests judicial notice of the First Amended Complaint, Cornerstone’s cross-complaint againstMacario, Macario’s cross-complaint against RLI, and RLI’s complaint against Cornerstone in the EasternDistrict federal court. The request is granted pursuant to Evid. Code § 452(d).IV. Demurrer A. Governing law A demurrer tests whether the complaint sufficiently states a valid cause of action. (Hahn v. Merda(2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 740, 747.) Complaints are read as a whole, in context, and are liberallyconstrued. (Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318; see also Stevens v. Superior Court (1999) 75Cal.App.4th 594, 601.) In reviewing the sufficiency of a complaint, courts accept as true all material factsproperly pleaded, but not contentions, deductions, conclusions of fact or law, the construction ofinstruments pleaded, or facts impossible in law. (Rakestraw v. California Physicians’ Service (2000) 81Cal.App.4th 39, 43; see also South Shore Land Co. v. Petersen (1964) 226 Cal.App.2d 725, 732.)Matters which may be judicially noticed are also considered. (Serrano v. Priest (1971) 5 Cal.3d 584,591.) If a demurrer is sustained, leave to amend should be granted where the complaint’s defect can becured by amendment. (The Swahn Group, Inc. v. Segal (2010) 183 Cal.App.4th 831, 852.) A court abusesits discretion by denying leave to amend where there is any reasonable possibility that the plaintiff canstate a valid cause of action. (Goodman v. Kennedy (1976) 18 Cal.3d 335, 349.) However, “[l]eave toamend should be denied where the facts are not in dispute and the nature of the claim is clear, but noliability exists under substantive law.” (Lawrence v. Bank of America (1985) 163 Cal.App.3d 431, 436.)The burden is on the plaintiff to show how the complaint can be amended, and how that amendment willchange the legal effect of the pleading. (Goodman, supra, at p. 349.) B. First cause of action: declaratory relief In the Cross-complaint, Macario seeks “a declaration that [RLI is] obliged to indemnify the actionherein on behalf of [Cornerstone], and [Cornerstone] has a present right to receive a defense from [RLI].”(Cross-complaint, Prayer ¶ 1.) That is, in his first cause of action, Macario seeks this Court’s declarationthat RLI is required to honor the terms of its insurance policy with Cornerstone, despite not having beentimely informed of Plaintiffs’ potential claim against Cornerstone. “Any person interested . . . under a contract [may] bring an original action . . . for a declaration ofhis rights and duties in the premises, including a determination of any question of construction or validityarising under such instrument or contract.” (CCP § 1060.) RLI argues that Macario lacks standing toseek this relief because he is not a party to the insurance policy under which he seeks to compel RLI’sperformance, and therefore not “interested . . . under the contract.” The Court agrees that a non-party to acontract lacks standing to seek a declaration of rights under that contract. (See, e.g., Fladeboe v.American Isuzu Motors (2007) 150 Cal.App.4th 42, 55; Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 331.)Macario argues in response that has standing to seek declaratory relief because he was paid a commissionfor brokering the policy and is therefore a third-party beneficiary of it, and therefore has standing to sue toenforce it. (Oppo at pp. 5-6.) A third party may bring a cause of action on a contract only when three conditions are met: thethird party would in fact benefit from the contract; “a motivating purpose of the contracting parties was toprovide a benefit to the third party”; and “permitting a third party to bring its own breach of contractaction against a contracting party is consistent with the objectives of the contract and the reasonableexpectations of the contracting parties.” (Goonewardene v. ADP, LLC (2019) 6 Cal.5th 817, 830.) “Allthree elements must be satisfied to permit the third party action to go forward.” (Ibid.) The contract at issue here, the insurance policy issued by insurer RLI for the benefit of insuredCornerstone, appears as Exhibit B to Exhibit D of RLI’s request for judicial notice. Nothing about itsuggests that a motivating purpose of RLI and Cornerstone was to provide Macario with a commission.Macario avers that “the contract explicitly includes Macario’s commission as part of the consideration.”(Oppo at p. 6.) Macario does not point out where in the contract that explicit inclusion is to be found, andit is not obvious to the Court. Nothing in the policy mentions a commission, or payment to a broker forarranging the policy, or anything along those lines. RLI’s response to Macario’s contention that thepolicy “explicitly includes Macario’s commission as part of the consideration” is that “It does no suchthing.” (Reply at p. 2, fn. 1.) The Court sees no basis to disagree with that assessment. Moreover, even if Macario were a third-party beneficiary, his ability to enforce the policy wouldextend only to the benefits he stood to receive. A third party suing on a contract “bears the burden ofproving that the promise he seeks to enforce was actually made to him personally or to a class of which heis a member.” (Neverkovec v. Fredericks (1999) 74 Cal.App.4th 337, 348-349.) If the policy contained aprovision that Macario was to be paid a commission – which, again, it does not – Macario could sue tocollect that commission if it was not paid, but he would still not be entitled to sue to enforce a promisemade by one of the contracting parties to the other one, because that would be a promise not made to himpersonally. The demurrer is sustained with respect to the first cause of action. Since Macario could notpossibly allege anything that would change the fact that he is not a party to the contract he seeks toenforce, leave to amend is denied. C. Second cause of action: equitable indemnity The principle of equitable indemnity “permit[s] the equitable sharing of loss between multipletortfeasors.” (American Motorcycle Association v. Superior Court (1978) 20 Cal.3d 578, 597; GemDevelopers v. Hallcraft Homes of San Diego, Inc. (1989) 213 Cal.App.3d 419, 426.) The operative wordis “tortfeasors.” Equitable indemnity is a tort concept. Cornerstone is suing Macario for professionalnegligence, so there is no question that he is alleged to be a tortfeasor. (RJN, Exh. B at p. 9.) Thequestion, then, is whether RLI is a joint tortfeasor; that is, whether Cornerstone’s damages, which consistof exposure to potential liability for Plaintiffs’ claims with no insurance coverage, are caused by RLI’stortious conduct, in addition to Macario’s alleged tortious conduct. RLI’s argument, in summary, is thatRLI cannot possibly be a joint tortfeasor because its relationship with Cornerstone is based purely oncontract, specifically on the insurance policy. Macario argues that his “involvement in the alleged wrongful acts, including misrepresentation ofthe Policy requirements, when combined with RLI’s subsequent actions denying coverage, does establisha basis for tort liability.” (Oppo at p. 10.) He does not explain how it establishes that. However, thesecond paragraph in the equitable indemnity cause of action comes close: “Therefore, CROSS-COMPLAINANT would be entitled to complete or partial equitable indemnity from CROSS-DEFENDANTS if the damages and relief claimed are covered under the any [sic] policy issued byCROSS-DEFENDANT.” It is possible for an insurer to wrongfully deny coverage and incur only liabilityfor breach of contract; if that were the situation, RLI’s (hypothetical) wrongful action would not makeRLI a joint tortfeasor, and RLI could, therefore, not be liable for equitable indemnity. However, if RLI’sdenial of coverage were not only wrongful, and not only breach of contract, but also a tort, then RLIwould arguably be a joint tortfeasor. An insurer’s denial of coverage can be a tort if it is done in bad faith. “An insurer is said to act in‘bad faith’ when it not only breaches its policy contract but also breaches its implied covenant to dealfairly and in good faith with its insured.” (Jordan v. Allstate Insurance Co. (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 1062,1071.) “When the insurer unreasonably and in bad faith withholds payment of the claim of its insured, itis subject to liability in tort.” (Frommoethelydo v. Fire Insurance Exchange (1986) 42 Cal.3d 208, 214-215.) Thus, in theory, Macario and RLI could be joint tortfeasors if Cornerstone’s injury resulted from acombination of Macario’s professional negligence and RLI’s bad faith denial of Cornerstone’s claim.(See, e.g., National Union Fire Ins. Co. (2004) 118 Cal.App.4th 1061, 1078.) Since the second cause of action incorrectly alleges that Macario would be entitled to equitableindemnity from RLI in the case of any wrongful denial of coverage, the demurrer is sustained as to thatcause of action. However, leave to amend is granted. Macario may amend the second cause of action toallege that he would be entitled to equitable indemnity if RLI is found to have denied Cornerstone’s claimin bad faith. The Court takes no position on whether Macario could prove such an allegation, but thatquestion does not arise at the demurrer stage.V. Severance of the cross-action A. RLI is not an appropriate party to this lawsuit “Generally an insurer may not be joined as a party-defendant in the underlying action against theinsured by the injured third party. The fact that an insurer has agreed to indemnify the insured for anyjudgment rendered in the action does not make the insurer a proper party. Liability insurance is not acontract for the benefit of the injured party so as to allow it to sue the insurer directly.” (Royal SurplusLines Ins. Co. v. Ranger Ins. Co. (2002) 100 Cal.App.4th 193, 200, citing Rutter Group, Cal. PracticeGuide: Insurance Litigation ¶ 15.11.) This principle springs from Evid. Code § 1155, which provides thatevidence that a defendant was insured at the time of an injury “is inadmissible to prove negligence orother wrongdoing.” RLI argues that this principle requires the Court to either sustain the instant demurrerwithout leave to amend or sever Macario’s cross-complaint against RLI from the case at bar. The Court agrees. The point of this rule is to avoid the trial of a personal injury action and anaction against the defendant’s insurer before the same jury, because in such a trial, “the fact of [thedefendant’s] liability insurance would . . . be disclosed to the jury which would be determining the issuesinvolved, a circumstance which is generally held a matter of prejudice.” (State Farm Mutual Auto. Ins. v.Superior Court (1956) 47 Cal.2d 428, 432.) The holding to which the court referred became a statutoryrule when Evid. Code § 1155 took effect in 1967. “A joint trial against the insured for negligence andagainst the insurer for violating its duties under [Ins. Code § 790.03(h), which prohibits unfair claimssettlement practices] would obviously violate both the letter and spirit of [Evid. Code § 1155].” (RoyalGlobe Ins. Co. v. Superior Court (1979) 23 Cal.3d 880, 891.) Moradi-Shalal v. Fireman’s Fund (1988)46 Cal.3d 287 overruled Royal Globe on the issue of whether there is a private cause of action againstinsurers for unfair settlement practices, but cited the above-quoted passage from Royal Globe withapproval as authority for sustaining the insurer’s demurrer. (Id. at p. 306.) In State Farm, supra, the insurer brought a declaratory relief action against its insured, Collins,seeking a determination of whether the automobile accident in which Collins had been involved wascovered by the policy. (State Farm, supra, 47 Cal.2d at p. 430.) While that action was pending, severalpeople who had been involved in the accident sued Collins. (Ibid.) The trial court consolidated theactions, resulting in a case involving both a tort action against Collins and a coverage action betweenCollins and the insurer. (Ibid.) Our Supreme Court held that the consolidation was an abuse of discretionand ordered the two actions severed. (Id. at p. 433.) In Royal Globe, supra, the plaintiff sued both thefood market where she had fallen and its insurer. (Royal Globe, supra, 23 Cal.3d at p. 884.) Althoughthe Supreme Court agreed with the plaintiff that “a third party claimant may sue an insurer” for violationsof the statute prohibiting unfair claims practices, it held that such a lawsuit must be separate from thepersonal injury action against the claimant. (Ibid.; again, the former holding was subsequently overturnedby Moradi-Shalal, supra.) The situation here differs slightly. State Farm and Royal Globe both involved a single individualwho was the defendant in the underlying tort action and also engaged in a dispute with the insurerregarding his own coverage (as a plaintiff in the case of Royal Globe and as a defendant in the case ofState Farm). Here, in contrast, the cross-defendant in the cross-action for malpractice, Macario, has suedthe insurer, RLI, over its coverage of someone else, the cross-complainant Cornerstone. That would be acrucial distinction if the cross-action were the entire lawsuit. The evil that the rule under discussion seeksto avoid is a jury learning that a defendant has insurance coverage, which Evid. Code § 1155 forbids thejury from knowing. All the jury would learn at a trial of the cross-action is that Cornerstone has insurancecoverage, which could not prejudice them in favor of granting damages to Cornerstone and againstMacario since Cornerstone would not be a party. However, the cross-action is not the entire lawsuit. The case at bar is, at its core, an action by theMahrts against Cornerstone. That is, in addition to being a cross-complainant, Cornerstone is also adefendant. Therefore, under Evid. Code § 1155, the jury is not permitted to know that Cornerstone hasinsurance that might arguably cover the plaintiffs’ damages, even under the circumstance that the insurerdisputes coverage. If this lawsuit proceeds as currently structured, the jury would inevitably learn that.Therefore, RLI is not an appropriate party. B. The authorities cited by Macario are not to the contrary. Macario states that his “situation is distinguishable because his claim involves professionnegligence and the need for equitable indemnity,” and that his “claims against RLI involve allegations ofprofessional negligence and the handling of the insurance claim.” (Oppo at pp. 12, 13.) (To be clear, it isCornerstone’s claim against Macario that involves allegations of professional negligence.) As authorityfor the proposition that these facts change anything, Macario cites to Otay Land Co. v. Royal IndemnityCo. (2008) 169 Cal.App.4th 556, characterizing it as an example of “situations where insurers have beenincluded due to their significant involvement in the underlying issues.” (Oppo at p. 13.) In Otay, theinsurer was included because it was the defendant: Otay is a simple two-party lawsuit by an insuredagainst its insurer for a declaratory judgment regarding coverage. (Id. at p. 558.) It does not address theissue presented here of an insurer and its insured both being sued by someone else in the same lawsuit. Macario also asserts that “[t]his almost precise scenario was presented in” Royal Surplus, supra,100 Cal.App.4th 193. (Oppo at p. 14.) “Almost precise” is not the same as “precise”; Royal Surpluscomes somewhat closer than Otay to being on point, but is distinguishable on its facts. There, a generalcontractor and its insurer (respectively Ocean and Royal Surplus) sued a subcontractor and its insurer(respectively Ultimate and Ranger) for indemnity after tenants of an apartment complex built by Ocean,with framing work done by Ultimate, sued Ocean over habitability issues. (Id. at pp. 196-197.) The trialcourt “sustained Ranger’s demurrer without leave to amend solely on the ground of misjoinder in that itwas improper to name both the insured and insurer in the same action.” (Id. at p. 198.) That is, the trialcourt dismissed the case on the same grounds upon which RLI urges this Court to dismiss Macario’scross-complaint. The reviewing court reversed. However, the reason for the reversal was that Ocean and Ultimatehad an explicit indemnification agreement “that required Ultimate to defend and indemnify Ocean forclaims arising out of Ultimate’s work,” and also required Ocean to be named as an additional insured onUltimate’s policy with Ranger. (Royal Surplus, supra, 100 Cal.App.4th at p. 196.) Therefore, this wasnot a so-called third-party case where an injured party sues both the party that injured him and that party’sinsurer; it was a first-party case where an injured party sued its own insurer, which is what Ranger waswith respect to Ocean under the indemnification agreement. (Id. at p. 200 [“If Ocean is an additionalinsured, then it is a first party”].) No such agreement exists here. In contrast to Royal Surplus, this is purely a third-party actionwhere a party (Macario) not in contractual privity with the insurer (RLI) is contesting the insurer’scoverage decision regarding a third party (Cornerstone). Thus, Royal Surplus does not contradict RLI’sargument that it will be severely prejudiced, in precisely the manner Evid. Code § 1155 is intended toprevent, if it is forced to litigate RLI’s claim in the same case as the Mahrts’ action against RLI’s insuredCornerstone. Finally, Macario avers that in Omaha Indemnity Co. v. Superior Court (1989) 209 Cal.App.3d1266, “the court acknowledged that insurers could be included in actions where their involvement in theunderlying issues was significant.” (Oppo at p. 15.) Omaha involves a lawsuit by landlords againsttenants who had damaged the landlords’ rental property, as well as against Omaha, the tenants’ insurer.(Id. at p. 1269.) Omaha demurred on the basis that the tenants “were not parties to the contract ofinsurance and, therefore, had no standing to pursue a claim for declaratory relief.” (Id. at pp. 1269-1270.)(That is, on the same basis upon which RLI demurs to Macario’s first cause of action.) The trial courtoverruled the demurrer; correctly, as the reviewing court determined, because just as in Royal Surplus, theinsurance policy was “for the mutual benefit of landlord and tenant.” (Id. at p. 1269.) Therefore thelandlords were “the intended beneficiaries of the insurance policy. . . . In such instances, an action fordeclaratory relief is appropriate.” (Id. at pp. 1269, 1270.) However, this did not satisfy Omaha, which insisted that despite being in contractual privity withthe landlords, “it would suffer prejudice should the lawsuit against both itself and the [tenants] goforward.” (Omaha, supra, 209 Cal.App.3d at p. 1270.) As RLI has done here, Omaha had moved in thetrial court, as an alternative to sustaining their demurrer, to sever the declaratory relief action against themfrom the tort lawsuit against the tenants. (Ibid.) The trial court had denied that motion. After severallitigation maneuvers not relevant here, the reviewing court agreed that the actions needed to be severed inorder to avoid prejudice to Omaha, and issued a writ of mandate ordering the trial court to grant themotion to sever. (Id. at p. 1275.) As with Royal Surplus, the reviewing court’s ruling on the demurrer was based on the point thatthis was a first-party lawsuit; that is, that the plaintiffs were in contractual privity with the insurer. Again,that is not the situation here. However, as discussed next, the Omaha’s holding that “the trial courtabused its discretion when it denied Omaha’s motion to sever,” is highly relevant here. (Omaha, supra,209 Cal.App.3d at p. 1271.) C. Macario’s cross-complaint for equitable indemnity is severed from the underlying action. “The court, in furtherance of convenience or to avoid prejudice, or when separate trials will beconducive to expedition and economy, may order a separate trial of any cause of action, including a causeof action asserted in a cross-complaint.” (CCP § 1048(b).) “[A] complaint and a cross-complaint are, formost purposes, treated as independent actions. [Citations.] It is within the discretion of the court to ordera severance and separate trials of such actions [citations], and the exercise of such discretion will not beinterfered with on appeal except when there has been a manifest abuse thereof.” (McLellan v. McLellan(1972) 23 Cal.App.3d 343, 353, citing McArthur v. Shaffer (1943) 59 Cal.App.2d 724, 727.) RLI requests that in the event the Court does not dismiss Macario’s cross-complaint altogether, itsever the cross-action from the underlying lawsuit by the Mahrts against RLI’s insured Cornerstone.(MPA at pp. 18-19; Reply at p. 9.) Macario expresses a preference for proceeding in the current action,but provides no authority for the proposition that he is entitled to do so. (Oppo at p. 15.) His commentthat “without the inclusion of RLI in this action, there is . . . the possibility that the rights of Macario maybe essentially adjudicated in a proceeding in which he is not a participant (i.e. – the federal court action)”presumably refers to the point that his cause of action for declaratory relief in the instant case is anattempt to resolve the same question that is before the Eastern District in the RLI Insurance v. Cornerstonecase: whether the RLI/Cornerstone insurance policy is active and enforceable. But as discussed above, thatis between RLI and Cornerstone irrespective of what court it is litigated in or who else is a party to thelitigation. The Court agrees that the severance RLI requests is the best way to permit Macario to go forwardwith an action for equitable indemnity without prejudicing RLI by disclosing to the Mahrt v. Cornerstonejury that it is Cornerstone’s insurer. (Evid. Code § 1155.) Accordingly, the Court orders that Macario’scross-complaint against RLI be severed, and proceed as a separate lawsuit.VI. Conclusion The demurrer to the first cause of action is sustained without leave to amend. The demurrer to thesecond cause of action is sustained with leave to amend. Macario’s cross-complaint is severed.

Ruling

HYSON vs SELECT PORTFOLIO SERVICING INC.

Aug 31, 2024 |CVPS2403212

HYSON vs SELECT PORTFOLIO Motion to be Relieved as Counsel forCVPS2403212SERVICING INC. LINDA HYSONTentative Ruling: Grant. Moving counsel is ordered to lodge with the Court within 5 days a revisedproposed order including all upcoming hearing dates. Counsel is reminded that they are not relieveduntil they have filed with the Court proof of service of the signed order upon their client.

Ruling

KATRINA ALLEN, ET AL. VS AMCAL LAS BRISAS FUND, LP, ET AL.

Sep 03, 2024 |23STCV23501

Case Number: 23STCV23501 Hearing Date: September 3, 2024 Dept: 56 SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA FOR THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES - CENTRAL DISTRICT KATRINA ALLEN, etc., et al., Plaintiffs, vs. AMCAL LAS BRISAS FUND, LP, etc., et al. Defendants. CASE NO.: 23STCV23501 [TENTATIVE] ORDER RE: MOTION TO COMPEL RESPONSES TO SPECIAL INTERROGATORIES, SET ONE, FORM INTERROGATORIES, SET ONE, REQUESTS FOR PRODUCTION, SET ONE, AND FOR AN ORDER THAT THE TRUTH OF THE MATTERS SPECIFIED IN REQUESTS FOR ADMISSIONS, SET ONE BE DEEMED ADMITTED Date: September 3, 2024 Time: 8:30 a.m. Dept. 56 MOVING PARTY: Defendants, Amcal Las Brisas Fund, LP, Amcal Multi-Housing, Inc., Las Palmas Foundation, The John Stewart Company, Percival Joseph Vaz (collectively, Defendants) RESPONDING PARTY: None The Court has considered the moving papers. No opposition has been filed. Any opposition was required to have been filed and served at least nine court days prior to the hearing. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1005, subd. (b).) BACKGROUND This action arises out of a real property habitability claim for rental property. On June 20, 2024, Defendants filed motions to compel responses by Plaintiffs to certain discovery requests (collectively, the Discovery Requests), consisting of special interrogatories, set one(SIs); form interrogatories, set one (FIs); and Requests for Production, set one (RFPs), and for an order that the truth of the matters specified in Requests for Admissions, set one (RFAs) be deemed admitted (collectively, the Motions). Plaintiff also seeks an award of monetary sanctions in the amount of $2,460 as to each motion, except as to the RFAs, where the request is for $3,060. DISCUSSION Legal Standard Interrogatories Under Code of Civil Procedure (CCP) section 2030.290, subdivision (b), when a party directs interrogatories towards a party, and that party fails to serve a timely response, the party propounding the interrogatories may move for an order compelling response to the interrogatories. (CCP § 2030.290, subd. (b).) A party who fails to provide a timely response waives any objection, including one based on privilege or work product. (Id., § 2030.290, subd. (a).) The moving party need only show that the interrogatories were served on the opposing party, the time has expired to respond to the interrogatories and no responses have been served in order for the court to compel the opposing party to respond. (Leach v. Superior Court (1980) 111 Cal.App.3d 902, 906.) Requests for Admissions When a party fails to serve a timely response to an RFA, the party propounding the RFA may move for an order to deem the genuineness of any documents and the truth of any matters specified in the requests admitted. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2033.280, subd. (b).) A party who fails to provide a timely response waives any objection, including one based on privilege or work product. (Id., § 2033.280, subd. (a).) Requests for Production of Documents When a party fails to serve a timely response to an RFP, the party making the demand may move for an order compelling a response thereto. (CCP § 2031.300, subd. (b).) A party who fails to provide a timely response waives any objection, including one based on privilege or work product. (Id., § 2031.300, subd. (a).) Defendants Motions In the Motions, Defendants seek orders compelling Plaintiffs to provide responses to the Discovery Requests. Defendants served the Discovery Requests on Plaintiffs on January 18, 2024. (Declaration of Harry Safarian[1] (Safarian Decl.), ¶¶ 4-6.) Although they received two extensions of time, as of the filing of the Motions Plaintiffs had failed to provide any response to the Discovery Requests, the final deadline for which was March 27, 2024. (Id., ¶¶ 5-7.) Defendants request that all admissions be deemed admitted, all objections be waived, and Plaintiffs be compelled to answer all Discovery Requests, and produce all documents responsive to the RFPs. Defendants Motions are unopposed and they are GRANTED. The Court orders that Plaintiffs serve Code-compliant, full and verified answers to the SIs, FIs and RFPs, without objection, on Defendants within twenty days of the date of this Order. All documents responsive to the RFPs are ordered to be produced to Defendants within twenty days of the date of this Order. The Court further orders that the RFAs are deemed admitted. The Court also finds that monetary sanctions are warranted against Plaintiffs in the reasonable sum of $1,440, consisting of 2 hours total for the preparation of the Motions at $600 per hour, plus four $60 filing fees. This amount is to be paid to Defendants within twenty days of the date of this Order. Moving party is ordered to give notice of this ruling. Parties who intend to submit on this tentative must send an email to the Court at SMC_DEPT56@lacourt.org as directed by the instructions provided on the court website at www.lacourt.org. If the department does not receive an email and there are no appearances at the hearing, the motion will be placed off calendar. Dated this 3d day of September, 2024 Hon. Holly J. Fujie Judge of the Superior Court [1] A separate declaration of Harry Safarian was submitted with each motion; however, each reference to service is almost identical. Therefore, the Court refers to the Safarian Decl. in the singular. Although the motion to compel as to the SIs referenced the service of the FIs, the Court understands that the declaration is related to the SIs.

Ruling

NEELY vs DUNN, JR.

Sep 01, 2024 |CVSW2311070

DEMURRER TO COMPLAINT BY FIRSTCVSW2311070 NEELY VS DUNN, JR.AMERICAN TITLE COMPANYTentative Ruling: SUSTAN the unopposed demurrer without leave to amend. GRANTthe request for judicial notice.

Ruling

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Sep 09, 2024 |Judge Colleen K. Sterne |19CV06268

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